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Abstract 
Earlier this year Wolfgang Kasper produced a book "Free to Work: The Liberalization of new Zealand's Labour Markets" 
(Centre for Independent Studies). By reviewing this book, the paper is able to shed some understanding of the effectiveness 
or otherwise of the Employments Contract Act. On the basis of the empirical evidence it is very difficult to reach, in a 
systematic way, Kasper 's conclusions about the beneficial effects of the Employment Contract Act. In particular the poor 
productivity growth rules out the likelihood that the ECA was a major contributor to the macroeconomic expansion of the 
mid 1990s. The Act would, however, seem to have contributed to the poor real wage growth, and the failure of many workers 
to obtain a share in any increase in prosperity of the 1990s. 
Were he alive, John Stuart Mill would be greatly puzzled by 
the naivety of the methodology used in the economic debate 
in New Zealand. Suppose the advocate has a theory which 
says if event A occurs, then event B will occur, and then 
something like event A does occur, and some time after 
something like event B occurs . This is then treated as proof 
of the validity of the theory . There is no attempt to consider 
whether A caused B, for association is sufficient. Moreover, 
suppose the theory also predicts that if A occurs then event 
C will occur, and in fact not-C actually occurs after A 
occurs. That not-C may be ignored, since the evidence ofB 
is sufficient to "prove" the theory's truth, and so there must 
be some other mitigating factor which invalidates the theo-
ry' s account of the causal impact from A to C. 
Thus are theories are defended, and the policies derived 
from them are justified. It is extremely difficult to challenge 
any theory in such circumstances, because there is always 
some event B, predicted by the theory, which will occur, 
while numerous other not-C events which occur cannot be 
used to discredit the theory . Moreover numerous theories 
will be confirmed by this weak methodology, which has no 
criteria for deciding between them. It becomes a matter of 
the belief of each theory 's supporter. Where there are more 
than one supporter, their mutual belief reinforces one anoth-
er's confidence. 
John Stuart Mill would despair at being unable to make any 
progress towards resolving the macroeconomic questions 
which confront New Zealand. He would want to use a much 
tougher methodology. At the very least he would want to 
compare various theories and see which gave a consistent 
account of more of the events which occurred. 
In order to avoid some of these difficulties, this paper uses 
those in Wolfgang Kasper's Free to Work, 1 which- as we 
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shall see - selectively reviews the available data and 
uncritically concludes that the Employment Contracts Act 
has benefited the economy. The merit of using his criteria 
- selecting his concepts, definitions, and periods - as the 
basis for a critique, is that it stacks the odds in favour of his 
support for the Employment Contracts Act (ECA). Yet we 
shall see that the case he makes of the macroeconomic 
benefits of the ECA is not compelling. 
GDP growth 
Kasper claims that the ECA stimulated economic growth, 
but is rather vague about how that occurred. Figure 1 repeats 
the first graph of Kasper's Figure 2, but includes more 
recent (and revised) data, and projects the GDP figures 
through to March 1999, using the September 1996 NZIER 
consensus forecasts, which average the predictions of 14 
forecasters.2 In addition a 'trend' growth rate of 3 percent 
p.a. is shown. 
The story it shows is clear enough, if unrecognized by 
Kasper. The New Zealand economy contracted and stag-
nated from 1990 (in fact from 1989) through to end 1992. 
From late 1992 the economy began a rapid (and widely 
hailed) expansion. 3 However this was not long enough to 
catch up to the 3 percent trend line. After 10 quarters the 
growth petered out, and was expanding at 2.8 percent in the 
year through to March 1996 and, according to the forecast-
ers' average, by 1.8 percent in the (current) year to March 
1997. Further out the forecasters expected growth to hover 
around 3 percent a year. 4 This contrasts with Kasper' s claim 
that .. the projection is for the economy is to keep growing for 
the remainder of the decade at a trend growth rate of around 
4 percent." (p.16) 
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Figure 1. Real GDP growth in New Zealand, 1990 to 1996 with forecasts to 1999 
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Real wages 
Kasper used a different presentation for his second graph of 
real wages changes. As Figure 2 shows, his presentation 
obscures how minuscule real (income) wage growth over 
the period has been- about 2 percent over seven years, with 
little prospect of further gains. 5 Probably part of the gains 
due to labour force composition effects. Hence the increase 
in real wages as the economy contracted and so lower paid 
workers were laid off, and the fall during the early part of the 
upswing. Kasper's own estimate is a 0.4 percent average 
growth of real wages. In summary, within the margin of 
error, and allowing for composition effects, real wages have 
hardly increased over the period. 
Labour productivity growth 
As the third of Kasper's graphs shows, employment num-
bers rose sharply from mid 1993, as one might expect in a 
cyclical upswing. Initially flrms expanded output by in-
creasing the intensity of labour usage within the fmn, and as 
under-utilized labour became exhausted they turned to an 
extensive expansion of hiring more workers. 
However Kasper does not consider the implications of high 
employment growth with modest output growth. As Figure 
3 shows, the productivity growth record for the New Zea-
land economy has been poor. In the seven years from 1990 
there was a total gain of around 5 percent, and the forecast-
ers do not expect any major increases in the immediate 
Figure 2. Real wages index for New Zealand, 1990 through 1996 
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Figure 3. Productivity (average output per worker) in New Zealand, 1990 through 1996 
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future. It is also evident that the big gains came during the 
period of the early upswing, when firms used their existing 
labour force more intensively. 
One might contrast this with the story which Kasper tells 
about the Australian economy. It has not been possible to 
check his statistics, but an eyeball of his data (p. 50-1) shows 
almost the same output growth over the period from 1990 to 
1995, except the Australian upswing was later and faster 
than the New Zealand one. However Australia experienced 
much less employment growth, by about 1 percent a year. 
Thus Australian productivity growth has outperformed 
New Zealand productivity growth - by about 1 percent a 
year. Given this evidence it is difficult to "conclude that the 
Employment Contracts Act has substantially enhanced the 
productivity oflabour ... " (p.51).6 
The productivity puzzle 
The productivity puzzle deserves further investigation. 
Detailed work by Bryan Philpott has provided a productiv-
ity series for the New Zealand economy back to 1977/8.7 
Three sectors- importables, exportables, and non-tradeables 
- are graphed in Figure 4. It is extremely hard to discern any 
significant change in the trend of any of the three series, 
once allowance is made for cyclical effects and measure-
ment problems. 8 Despite all the changes in the last decade, 
there is no perceptible impact of the reforms on the long run 
Figure 4. The productivity puzzle. Average labour productivity in New Zealand, 
1978 through 1995 
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Table 1. Annual increases in average labour productivity growth (% p.a.) 
Sector 
lmportab1es 
Exportab1es 
Non-Tradeables 
ALL SECTORS (GDP) 
Unrestructured Sectors 
Restructured Sectors 
1977/8-1985/6 
2.7 
4.0 
0.6 
1.6 
1.3 
3.7 
trend of overall productivity. This is true for the post-ECA 
era, and is true for the post 1984 era as well. 
One could even argue there has been a reduction in produc-
tivity growth in the five years after March 1991 compared 
to the five years which preceded it. Table 1 makes it hard to 
argue that there has been a definite increase in the produc-
tivity growth rate after the ECA was introduced, in contrast 
to the previous quinquennium. Indeed, as a rule the sectoral 
productivity growth rates in the first part of the 1990s appear 
to be lower than the rates before the restructuring began. 
Even the exceptions can be explained. Figure 5 summarizes 
Philpott's division of the economy into a restructured and 
unrestructured sectors. The former covers mining, forestry, 
electricity, and communications, characterized as those 
which were largely government owned in 1984, and expe-
rienced substantial corporatization and privatization. It is 
evident that the sectors experienced a substantial increase in 
their productivity growth following these reforms, although 
this boost stopped after 1992/3. 
Because the restructured sectors contributed only 10.3 
percent to GDP in 1997/8 rising to 15.7 percent in 1995/6, 
their substantial productivity gains do not seem to have 
impacted greatly on overall economic performance. One 
way of judging this is that had the restructured productivity 
1985/6-199011 
3.1 
4.0 
1.4 
2.2 
1.4 
8.9 
1990/1-1995/6 
0.8 
2.6 
0.9 
0.8 
0.2 
5.1 
grown after 1987/8 as it had before that date, (average) 
labour productivity for the whole economy would been only 
2.8 percent higher in 1995/6.9 On this measure the 
corporatization and privatization program added a fraction 
less than .5 percent to productivity growth between 1987/8 
and 1993/4.10 
A further complication to this story is illustrated in Figure 
6, which shows a downward sloping relationship between 
productivity and employment as PP. The relationship is a 
variation of a production function in which (at any time) 
output is merely a function of employment.11 It shows that 
if employment is OE, then the economy can produce on the 
production at X, so the average productivity is given by OA. 
An increase in productivity can occur in two different ways. 
First the production function may move out, say to p'p', so 
for the same employment OE the economy now produces at 
X' and productivity increases from OA to OA'. This is called 
a "shift of the production function". 
Alternatively if employment contracts from OE to OE', but 
the production function remains at PP, productivity also 
goes up from OA to OA'. This is called a "shift along the 
production function." 
These two sort of shifts are staple items of first year 
Figure 5. Average labour productivity in New Zealand for restructured and unrestructured 
sectors 1978 through 1996 
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Figure 6. The relationship between average 
labour productivity and employment 
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economics teaching. They are very different causes of a 
productivity gain, and they have different policy implica-
tions. It matters a lot whether the policy has resulted in 
higher overall productivity (that outward shift of the pro-
duction function), or whether it has simply reduced employ-
ment (so unemployment rises by EE'), put a lot of firms out 
of business, and junked a lot of old capital without increas-
ing (or even reducing) output or social welfare (the shift 
along the production function).12 Regrettably, claims that 
productivity has or has not increased are often made without 
reference to this important distinction. 
In summary, Kasper's and others claims that the ECA 
increased productivity growth cannot be sustained on the 
basis of the available data.13 But can it be argued that the 
ECA decreasedfroductivity growth, as Tim Hazeldine has 
done recently.! That argument is more consistent with the 
available data, but the complexity of the situation is such, 
that more work needs to be done before we can be certain, 
for there are so many other things going on. It seems likely 
that the research will show that the ECA had very little 
impact on productivity in either direction. 
The economy and the ECA 
The story the data tells is that the post-ECA economy was 
in a stagnation phase until late 1992. It then began to expand 
rapidly, initially by using the internal resources of firms but 
later by an employing more labour. Productivity gains were 
not high. It would appear that this extensive rapid growth 
phase was over by the end of 1995, and the New Zealand 
economy has now settled down to a modest long term 
growth rate of just under 3 percent p.a, based primarily on 
increased application of labour and ca!'ital, with little un-
derlying productivity growth. 
Kasper is keen to explain this not very impressive expansion 
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on the effects of the ECA. "It would be hard not to attribute 
most of this enhancement to the improved institutional 
framework surrounding labour markets" (p.45). Indeed 
Kasper could have been more explicit and said it was "easy" 
to explain the enhancement by the ECA. But easy explana-
tions are rarely correct ones. 
A richer account of the New Zealand growth experience of 
the mid 1990s is that there was a bounce back from the 
contraction/stagnation phase of the late 1980s and early 
1990s, fuelled by a favourable fall in the real exchange rate 
(which has since been reversed), a substantial improvement 
in the terms of trade (which are about 10 percent higher in 
the 1990s than they were in the late 1980s), and the upswing 
of the world economy (especially Australia, which in New 
Zealand' s case is the main market for manufactures) . How-
ever this expansion was based on additional applications of 
labour and capital, rather than improved productivity per-
formance. When the available capital and appropriately 
skilled labour ran out, economic growth slowed down. 
Which of these two accounts are to believed? Surely the 
poor productivity performance discriminates between them. 
If the Employment Contracts Act had worked in the way its 
proponents say it did, in the way which Kasper thinks it did, 
there should have been substantial an ongoing productivity 
gains . There have not been these gains, and so the ECA 
explanation of the expansion is not a viable one. 
Enthusiasm for the ECA 
Despite the lack of evidence of significant improvements in 
economic performance from the ECA there remains consid-
erable enthusiasm for the legislation. Undoubtedly some of 
the enthusiasm among managers is because of the change in 
the industrial relations balance it engender over managerial 
employee relations. However in economic terms there has 
been one substantial economic gain for employers. 
Figure 7 shows the real (income) wage (ofFigure 3) divided 
by the labour productivity index (of Figure 2), which gives 
a measure of the degree to which productivity gains had ben 
shared with workers.15 The overall pattern is that the index 
fell about four percent in the mid 1990s, suggesting that 
workers' wages have not shared in the (albeit small) produc-
tivity gains over the period. 
It would not be unreasonable to attribute this to the Employ-
ment Contracts Act. Such gains workers have had over the 
period have been the increasing number of jobs - which we 
have suggested are unlikely to be attributable in full to the 
ECA. There is therefore little evidence that the ECA has 
been beneficial to workers. 
(Two further issues- unemployment, and the paper by Tim 
Maloney which Kasper extensively quotes, are dealt with in 
appendices.) 
Summary 
On the basis of the empirical evidence it is very difficult to 
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Figure 7. Wage costs to productivity in New Zealand, 1990 through 1996 
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reach, in a systematic way, Kasper's conclusions about the 
beneficial effects of the Employment Contract Act. In 
particular the poor productivity growth rules out the likeli-
hood that the ECA was a major contributor to the 
macroeconomic expansion of the mid 1990s. The Act 
would, however, seem to have contributed to the poor real 
wage growth, and the failure of many workers to obtain a 
share in any increase in prosperity of the 1990s. 
Future research 
One is puzzled. Undoubtedly those who have made up their 
mind about the economic impact of the Employment Con-
tracts Act will find in the data evidence to support their 
prejudices, whether they believe the ECA beneficial or 
detrimental. (It is well to note that the opposition to the Act 
might argue too that there should be productivity gains, 
although in their case they would argue that the gains were 
at the expense of the working conditions.) Those of a more 
scientific bent can but continue to monitor the economic 
outcomes, perhaps at a more disaggregated level, in the 
hope there is some clue overlooked, some nuance yet to be 
observed. It may well be that the sort of macro-economic 
data used here, or the slightly more disaggregated data used 
by Tim Maloney and others, will not reveal much. Rather 
the need may be to look at worksites, and carefully evaluate 
to what extent the additional managerial freedom which the 
ECA allowed, resulted in new productivity inducing work 
methods, and to what extent it simply allowed managers to 
cut labour costs by cutting (or stopping increases in) wages 
and other elements of worker remuneration. 
APPENDIX 1: Unemployment 
Undoubtedly there has been a substantial fall in the New 
Zealand unemployment rate since its peak in 1991 of 11 
percent (or its shoulder of 1993).16 This is not surprising 
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given the sharp rise in employment. However Figure 8 
shows forecasters do not expect any further gains through to 
1997 or thereafter .17 The slow GDP growth rate means that 
insufficient labour is being taken on to reduce unemploy-
ment, despite the poor productivity growth. Forecasters 
expect the unemployment rate will hover above 6 percent 
throughout the late 1990s. 
In assessing the unemployment rate it should be noted that 
the rate was probably below 4 percent in 1984 when the 
reforms began, 18 and as recentl~ as 1988 the unemploy-
ment rate was below 6 percent. I 
Kasper compares the pattern of unemployment rates for 
Australia and New Zealand. Given his difficulty with deal-
ing with New Zealand data, one is reluctant to rely too 
heavily on exact figures- comparisons of international data 
are always difficult. However undoubtedly New Zealand 
has had a greater fall in is unemployment rate than Australia, 
since its employment growth has been greater. 
A note of caution needs to be added. Comparison of unem-
ployment rates, assuming consistent definitions of employ-
ment rates, are dependent upon some assumption about 
labour force participation rates (LFPR). It is well estab-
lished that LFPRs are subject to cyclical variation, tending 
to be more depressed when unemployment is high when 
those not employed are less active in seeking work while, 
conversely, when unemployment is low those previously in 
the not-in-the-labour force category seek work and may 
become unemployed. There are also secular changes- both 
the youngest and oldest age groups have had falling LFPRs, 20 
while the female LFPRs have been rising. 
How then are we to compare LFPRs (and hence unemploy-
ment rates) between different countries (even if the statisti-
cal definitions are exactly the same)? This is a troubling 
question in the case of the Australia New Zealand compari-
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Figure 8. Unemployment in New Zealand 1990 through 1997 
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son. Historically the New Zealand LFPRs were higher than 
the Australian ones (but we do not know why). However 
males LFPRs have generally been falling faster here than 
across the Tasman (so that Australian male LFPRs are now 
similar to the New Zealand rates), while New Zealand 
females LFPRs have been stagnant while Australian ones 
have been rising (although Australian female LFPRs are 
still lower than New Zealand ones). This presumably re-
flects Australia's more vigorous secular employment growth, 
which has better retained men in, and attracted women into, 
the labour force compared to New Zealand. However we 
would want to know more about the LFPR levels before we 
told the story with confidence. 
This is not to deny that measured unemployment is lower in 
New Zealand, and fell more between 1991 and 1995. The 
appendix simply notes that the comparison - indeed any 
international comparison - is complicated. 
APPENDIX 11: The Maloney Study. 
This is not the place to provide a full review of Tim 
Maloney's "Estimating the Effects of the Employment 
Contracts Act on Employment and Wages in New Zea-
land."21 However, Kasper quotes the paper favourably, so 
to ignore it might seem to practice that which the introduc-
tion condemned. All that is done here is warn that there are 
problems in using the work as significant evidence of the 
impact of the ECA on employment and wages. 
The study by Maloney depends heavily upon a measure of 
union density, the proportion of workers who are union 
members. The union membership series comes from two 
sources: theRegisterofUnions up to first quarter 1989, and 
Raymond Harbridge's survey of trade unions in fourth 
quarter 1991 and 1992 (p.326-327). The two series are 
spliced together and the missing quarters are interpolated. 
Both actions raise difficulties. 
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Since the ECA is effected from second quarter of 1991 , the 
series are on either side of the phenomenon which is being 
investigated. Any conceptual or measurement inconsisten-
cies in the series may be econometrically magnified into a 
statistical difference which merely reflects the different 
data series. Even ifHarbridge was as successful as he hoped 
in maintaining continuity, two further difficulties would 
remain. First, the series were measured at different times in 
the seasonal cycle. Second, many unions reported spuri-
ously higher membership numbers under the old regime, 
but the new regime forced them to be more accurate (as 
when union amalgamation resulted in the acquiring union 
discovering here were far fewer members than were claimed). 
The interpolation generates a spurious accuracy in the data. 
Altogether Maloney has 8 data points ( 6 before the ECA 
was introduced and 2 after), which he increases to 30 by 
interpolation. Now the econometrics is unaware of this, and 
so treats the data as though there are 30 independent 
observations of union density from a single data set, whereas 
there are only 8 independent observations from two separate 
data sets. The econometric impact of this is complicated, but 
as a first approximation we would expect the addition of 
interpolated data could halve the standard errors of the 
estimates of the coefficients on the union density vari-
able. 22 There is only one set of equations where the union 
density variable is identified as significant (Table 3) (albeit 
at only a ten percent level on a two tailed test) . Allowing for 
the interpolated data would make these results even less 
statistically significant. 
What this means is that in none of the estimated equations 
does Maloney find convincing statistical evidence of the 
impact of either the Employment Contracts Act directly, or 
indirectly via its impact on union density , on employment or 
wages. Maloney as much as acknowledges this when he 
writes " [s )uppose we accept that the ECA ... has resulted in 
increases in employment?". 
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But suppose that the econometrics had found a statistically 
significant relationship between the ECA and employment 
(and/or wages), after full allowance for the splicing and 
interpolation. Correlation is not the same thing as causation. 
There were many other policy (i.e. broadly exogenous) 
changes happening at about the same time. 23 To be compel-
ling, the study needs not only to find a statistically signifi-
cant relationship, but to demonstrate that there is no more 
plausible alternative explanation. 
As it happens the study did not find the former, and we are 
left with the impression that the main factors determining 
employment and wage rates over the first two post ECA 
years were macroeconomic variables like output and rela-
tive prices. 
Notes 
1. W . Kasper (1996) 
2. NZIER (1996) Consensus Forecasts, April1996, NZIER, 
Wellington. 
3 . Kasper says the recession came to an end in early 1991, 
but that gives more confidence to the quality of the GDP data 
than many would trust. The general impression, supported 
by the NZIER Quarterly Survey of Business Opinion, is that 
1991 was a depressed year. 
4 Since September, many forecasters have been revising 
down their forecasts for the 199617 and 1997/8 years, so the 
December consensus forecasts are likely to be even more 
pessimistic. 
5. Kasper does not define his variables even there are a 
number of possibilities. The numerator of Figure 2 is Aver-
age Hourly Earnings (ordinary time), the denominator is the 
Consumer Price Index. 
6. lfKasper is to be believed, the productivity gains are even 
less. "Some knowledgeable observers believe that employ-
ment statistics under-report employment growth since the 
ECA." (p.49) Who these "knowledgeable" people are is not 
explained. 
7 . B.P . Philpott ( 1996) The employment series is adjusted 
for part-time working. 
8. The non-tradeable ~ector has higher labour productivity 
levels than the tradeable sectors, is because it includes the 
capital intensive energy, communications, and home owner-
ship sectors. 
9. The calculation assumes that the sectors' output would 
have grown at the same rate without the additional produc-
tivity growth. 
10. Conversely, and making a series of assumptions to get 
an order of magnitude, there would have been an extra 
39,000 workers employed in the restructured sectors, and 
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unemployment would have been 77,000 or 4 .1 percent in 
March 1996. This was the level similar to that which it was 
in the mid 1980s (there was no HLFS at this time). 
11. If Y = f(E), which is a production function, then 
YIE = f(E)IE, which is the form of the function shown 
in Figure 6. 
12. Output when the production function shifts is OEX'B 
which is definitely larger than previous output OEXA. 
Whether output under the shift along the production curve 
increases (i.e. whether OE' Y A '>OEY A) depends upon the 
slope of the production function. 
13. The NZIER reports that a survey of managers reported 
" increased productivity and operational flexibility and greater 
training." Given there is no statistical evidence for substan-
tial gains in productivity above the long term trend, one 
might conclude that mangers are attributing normal produc-
tivity gains to the ECA, in a similar manner to Kasper 
attributing favourable economic events since 1991 to the 
ECA, despite there being little economic evidence to support 
his contention. QSBO March 1996. 
14. T.Hazeldine ( 1996). 
15. There is an issue as to whether the real income wage or 
the real product wages should be in the numerator. Real 
income wages were used here because they were illustrated 
in Figure 2. Thus the measure indicates that workers have not 
benefited from the productivity gains in their takehome pay. 
16. Kasper' s data seems to be seasonally adjusted. They 
have since been revised. Presumably the "white" male 
unemployment rate refers to the European!Pakeha 
rate."White" is not used in this context in New Zealand 
because of its racial connotations. The official categories 
involve ethnicity rather than race. 
17. Unlike Kasper's graph, the vertical axis of Figure 5 is not 
truncated, avoiding the impression of greater relative gains 
than actually happened. 
18. This particular series does not begin until 1986. 
19. But note endnote 10 of the main paper. 
20. The falling youth LFPR reflects more young people 
staying on in tertiary institutions (but also perhaps the 
greater difficulty of their finding work, since a full -time 
university who was doing a little work appears in the labour 
force statistics as part-time employed). The falling LFPRs 
for older age groups are thought to reflect changes in 
retirement choices, but again may also be influenced by job 
scarcity inducing early retirement. 
21. Maloney, T. ( 1994). 
22. (8/30) 112 is approximately 0 .5. 
23. For instance while one is not surprised by the conclusion 
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that the ECA reduced union density (indeed one would be 
astonished otherwise), the successful econometric equa-
tions demonstrating this are hardly compelling evidence. 
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